Libyan Political Agreement 2015

Pack, J. (January 2017). Does Libya face a “big political deal”? Al Monitor. The GNA condemned the peace deal between Israel and the UAE as an “unsurprising betrayal of the UAE.” [71] Regardless of the format, a forum is needed for the Presidential Council and its military advisers to negotiate the chain of command with the military of both sides or, at the very least, to find a substitute formula until a solution can be found to the Article 8 dispute. The Council must do more to trust that its security strategy will lead to a functioning army and police force, above the political divide. What it has done so far – the announcement of the creation of a presidential guard and the strengthening of eastern military actors like Barghathi and Jadran, the fragmentation of Haftar`s forces – is far from being a national security strategy and has backfired, especially since the internationals have worked for opposite ends. Crisis Group interviews, Brussels, September 2016; Foreign businessmen active in Libya, Rome, London, September 2016.See footnote However, the status quo (a degraded situation) can only lead to a long conflict that would plunge Libya into new chaos without a certain victory for any side, considerable damage to the economy and few of the possibilities that many hope for post-conflict reconstruction. Haftar currently enjoys growing support from international supporters such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (United Arab Emirates) and Russia[9], whether “publicly or secretly” in terms of political and military support. France has operational its aid for reasons of the fight against terrorism. [10] Some countries, mostly Western, object to the Presidential Council and the LPA recognizing the government or agreement. For the most part, there is also a gap at the international level as to the way forward.

[11] From the beginning, the Libyan Political Agreement (APA) [1], also known as the Skhirat Agreement, was marked by serious shortcomings. It was guaranteed in part despite the fact that the necessary domestic assistance was not received in accordance with its agreement — with the absence of major security sector actors at the negotiating table. This article discusses how it has failed so far and offers opportunities for inclusive renegotiation, as Libya is at a crucial point, as any action by the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNA) is essential in the search for lasting peace and unity in the country. The agreement as it stands is not, to a large extent, the panacea against libya`s political and security situation[2]. . . .